Egypt’s Youth Political Parties: Main Challenges and Obstacles | ||
By Nadine Abdalla Continuous political instability has made it difficult for all the new parties to build structures. Frequently, members have been busier coordinating protest activities and demonstrations than organizing the party internally. Given the lack of human and financial resources, they have been unable to manage both activities at the same time. Also, all of the new parties that have been absorbing the revolutionary youth are facing a number of structural and programmatic challenges, although to different degrees.
Lack of sustainable fundingScarcity of funds has especially harmed the performance of both the Constitution Party and the Popular Current and has limited their capacity to spread out geographically as well. Both formations have yet to develop a fundraising strategy that would allow them to finance their activities in a sustainable way. The presence of prominent public figures helps the Constitution Party to attract funds and funders. This funding is, however, still erratic and dependent on political seasons and events. During the founding phase, some funds were offered by supportive liberal businessmen, and donations by sympathizers were used to pay for the tents during the sit-ins against the constitutional declaration. However, the absence of reliable sources for funds that would cover, at least, the fixed costs of the party – such as office rents and the salaries of the administrative staff – has a negative impact on the political performance, since the leaders are preoccupied with administrative tasks and unable to focus on the political ones. The same applies to the Popular Current and prevents it from following through on its main approach that is, gaining support through developmental work with people on the ground. Since its establishment, the Popular Current’s main focus has turned to political activities and street protests, above all, thereby reducing the Popular Current to a protest movement. Furthermore, the lack of funds prevents both organizations from establishing new offices, especially in the south of Egypt. The Constitution Party has currently around 30 offices, and whereas a number of the party’s founders in northern Egypt inaugurated new offices on their own initiative and paid the costs out of their own pockets, those in the south cannot afford this. According to the party’s youth leaders, establishing an office in a certain area is crucial for building the party’s support in that area. Given the limited funding, the party has not yet been able to create offices outside the main cities. Geographical penetration also remains a challenge for the Strong Egypt party, whose 30 to 35 offices are centered in cities, with a higher density in the north. Contrary to the Muslim Brothers and Salafids, who have managed to gain support in villages, all the newly established parties are mostly present in the cities and have still not managed to reach the countryside. The referendum on the constitution, in which the opposition obtained significantly less support in the south than in Cairo and northern Egypt, was a good indicator of this lack of penetration.
Structural weaknessesCoordination between headquarters in Cairo and party chapters in the governorates is weak in both the Constitution Party and the Popular Current. By opening new offices in Cairo and many of the northern governorates on their own initiative, the highly mobilized youth of the Constitution Party has created a decentralized structure that further challenges the party’s already limited coordination mechanisms. Finding a proper balance between decentralization and internal cohesion through structured patterns of communication is direly required. In addition, these structural weaknesses render the integration of other opposition parties into the framework of the Constitution Party impossible, at least in the short and medium term. To realize its declared objective of becoming an umbrella for the revolutionary forces, the party will have to get a grip on its internal structures first. This problem is even more pronounced in the case of the Popular Current. Although decentralized activities were very much encouraged by the Sabahy campaign, no effective structure of communication was established. The transformation of the campaign into a flexible movement structure even amplified the organizational weaknesses and lack of cohesion. In contrast, the AbulFutuh campaign was characterized by efficient organization structures, owing, at least partially, to the experience that many of its members had gained in the Muslim Brotherhood. The Strong Egypt party therefore has the opportunity of having an infrastructure to build upon. A higher degree of internal coordination and cohesion is apparent – as compared with the other two parties – and makes the party appear a sustainable alternative in the long term.
Generational rifts and obstacles for participationThis problem is especially obvious in the case of the Constitution Party. On the one hand, the party suffers from a lack of horizontal coordination between its committees and a lack of vertical coordination between those committees and the decision-making body inside the party, represented by its president and the executive committee. The lack of structured communication and mechanisms for participation has led to generational conflicts between older leaders at the top and the youth in the ranks. Rather than enriching the party, generational pluralism is thus threatening to become a liability that is harming its cohesion. In early January 2013, a considerable number of youth members staged a sit-in inside the main party office in Cairo to request changes in the party leadership. Holding early elections for youth leaders in local party chapters, thereby guaranteeing a higher degree of youth participation at the base of the party structure was another major demand. On the other hand, the revolutionary and sometimes individualistic attitudes of some of the youth have contributed to this rift. They still refuse to accept adherence to formal structures and hierarchical decision-making. Political education of the youth would help to establish a balance between internal democracy and discipline within new parties. It would also help to form future youth leaders with progressive and realistic political views rather than merely revolutionary and sometimes utopian visions. In contrast, there are no visible signs of a generational rift within Strong Egypt. This is due to the party’s more solid organizational structures, which guarantee the presence of internal mechanisms for participation. This is done, for example, by holding workshops for the party’s members in almost all the governorates to listen and interact before taking major decisions. This was the case before the party announced its decision in early March 2013 to participate in the next parliamentary elections. Furthermore, the absence of political figures from the older generation – other than AbulFutuh – facilitated the presentation of youth in leadership positions. They are thus present in large numbers in all decision-making bodies, such as the party’s political bureau.
Internal struggles and currentsStrong Egypt in particular has been struggling with internal differences caused by the presence of two distinct currents within the party. The first current is constituted by the revolutionary youth, who have politically progressive views and clearly oppose the current rulers. The other current is politically more conservative and therefore less willing to take positions against the current rule. This second current can be differentiated into three categories: former members of the Muslim Brotherhood who still have social ties to the organization and are inclined to adopt its positions; those who were never part of the Brotherhood but who have familial or social ties with the organization; and, finally, people who just prefer to adopt politically conservative positions in the hope that they lead to more stability in the country. These differences endanger the cohesion of the party, something that became obvious in the crisis over the constitutional declaration and the constitutional referendum. Two-thirds of the party rejected the constitution, causing weeks of infighting and several defections. Achieving that percentage was the result of the youth leaders’ huge efforts at persuasion among party members in Cairo and the governorates. Their main arguments were that this constitution would not guarantee social and economic rights and would institutionalize the army’s interference in politics. Certainly, the party’s good organizational mechanisms and structure of internal democracy has helped to decrease internal tensions. However, the party needs to work out a strategy for a political education program for its members. Such a program will help them to reformulate their ideas and express clearer visions – and to form a more coherent membership. The problem of opposing political and ideological orientations is liable to occur within the Popular Current as well. Since the movement accepts members of other political parties and movements, conflicts regarding loyalties are certain to arise once that party adopts a line or positions that the Popular Current opposes. In the long term, this problem may harm the sustain-ability of the movement. Moreover, double membership makes it difficult to estimate the real strength of the movement, because there is no definite way to assess where primary loyalties lie.
The challenge of age compositionThe lack of middle-age cadres is in itself a challenge. For one, this compromises the organizations’ capacities to field a sufficient amount of candidates in parliamentary elections who have viable chances to win seats, which requires a certain amount of social capital and experience. To remedy this problem, one of the strategies is the cooptation of public figures who share the same stances as the party to compete in its name. The dynamism of highly mobilized youth offers an opportunity for the creation of new leadership and alternatives to Egypt’s old parties and movements. However, in order to consolidate themselves, the new youth-dominated political parties need to develop their internal structures and their cadres alike.
Nadine Abdalla is a Ph.D. Fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the Stiftung SWP Comments 11 Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). This article was published by German Institute for International and Security Affairs.
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