Traditional Discourse, Common Ground for All Forces in Egypt | ||
Traditional Discourse, Common Ground for All Forces in Egypt By J. Fatemi Today the crucial division in Egyptian society is between old guard who are adept at the political game and the hopeful youth and Islamists who must find a path forward. Although a polarization of Islamic and secular forces in Egypt is now evident, it is minimal because the elections showed that Islamists have the majority in the Egyptian society. Nevertheless, the biggest duality in society emanates from the tension between the old guard and youthful/progressive forces; between those who have something to lose – the old guard – and those who are defending the hope for a better future – the Islamists. Right after the revolution many people, especially the youth, thought that the rules of the political game have finally changed. Many people started believing that Egypt's politics had shifted from that of the elite (that includes giving political clout to those with money or supported by traditional institutions like family and mosque/church) to that of the street, where those who have the competence and grassroots legitimacy are the ones who lead society. That observation was right in a sense and wrong in another. Money, media, family and religious institutions still play a big part in Egyptian politics; the election results proved this hypothesis. But the youth’s demands overlapped exactly with that of the Islamists. Moreover, the arguments of the Islamists can create common ground that all parties and factions aspire for, except probably the old guard. In that kind of milieu, the old guard and reactionary forces are either to join the progressive forces or stop creating hurdles in the way of fulfillment of people’s aspirations. There are three different groups of youth revolutionaries today: those who were actively involved in "underground politics" before the revolution but don't actually have the set of skills needed for building institutions and making the impact that the revolution calls for. Another group is those who actually have the skills but were not necessarily active in direct political activities against the regime through protesting or advocating human rights, but also could be in the fields of development, business and others. A third cluster encompasses those that never participated in anything, with fear being one major common factor along with poverty, incompetence, social alienation, and so forth. These groups face huge challenges today, and in the pursuit of their happiness, they must not only embrace the principles of the revolution and work hard towards them, but also overpower certain stakeholders in society that are standing as an obstacle – whether willingly or subconsciously – in the face of real change. Those challenges facing youth today stem from the resistance imposed by old guard in society who are ruthlessly defending their current privileges and, sometimes, their mere existence. Those forces had a different idea of the "what" and "how" of change, ranging from those who don't want change and are fighting to go back to Mubarak's regime, to those who do not mind inducing some cosmetic changes for the favor of keeping their special status, as in the case of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to groups that want change but are sometimes more conservative than Edmund Burke himself, the godfather of conservative thinking and gradual change, such as the Salafist movements, secular businessmen like Naguib Sawiris and parties like the Wafd. Those forces utilize their hard and soft powers interchangeably to outmanoeuvre calls for fast and profound institutional and societal change. Over and above, as elections took place, many youth protesting and striking in different squares around Egypt started to develop the feeling that attention will shift from "Tahrir" to other venues, such as parliament. However, this "Tahrir nostalgia" is dangerous, because the revolution that started as a completely grassroots call for change with no leadership but its ideas doesn't need personification or contextualisation; it rather needs being taken into everyone's backyard. Otherwise this way of thinking will alienate people and take support away from those calling for it. The struggle for change now in Egypt is summarized in the battle – or rather the war – between those who are conservative and those calling for more radical change. Conservative forces have been there for a long time; they have their own rules of the game. For the new forces to emerge and sustain their struggle, they need to completely change the rules and devise a new game with new rules. Parliament the Right Institution to Decide about Economic Problems in Egypt Faced with economic threats on several fronts, Egypt's rulers look unlikely to come up with a coherent policy response as the country heads into a long and turbulent election period which may make tough decisions even more difficult. The Parliament election in Egypt is over. It is time to prepare the grounds for handing over the power to true representatives of the people to take appropriate decisions to fix economic problems. The Egyptian society today has to struggle to cope with rising food prices, tumbling foreign reserves and a looming state budget crunch that are complicating the situation. Addressing any of the problems could worsen the others – cutting state spending on food subsidies to strengthen state finances, could increase the impact of food inflation and trigger more unrest. So far, authorities have shied away from strong action on any of the problems. Election to the lower house is over, with upper house polls taking place from the end of January into March. During this period, the government will lack a popular mandate for economic policy changes. And a new parliament will not necessarily mean more decisive policy-making; presidential powers will stay with the military council until a vote for the presidency. Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who runs the council, promised that a civilian president would be elected in June. That is about six months sooner than previously planned, but still threatens six more months of vacuum in decision-making. The most pressing economic threat is the slide in Egypt's foreign reserves as tourism and export earnings suffer from the unrest and capital flees the country. Reserves tumbled from around $36 billion at the start of 2011 to $22.1 billion in October, and may in coming months reach levels where the central bank is no longer able to prevent a sharp, sudden depreciation of the Egyptian pound. Egypt could initially have responded to the problem by imposing some form of capital controls, or by allowing a slow, controlled fall of the currency that could stimulate economic growth and reduce pressure for further depreciation. It may now be too late to take either action without causing panic in the currency market and fresh instability. “The immediate priority has to be agreeing international financial help or the pound will slide, one expert maintains. “If external aid does not materialize, the Egyptian pound depreciation will be more severe.” At the current rate of capital outflows, even IMF aid and further assistance from Persian Gulf countries might only delay rather than prevent a sharp fall of the currency. Foreign reserves dropped by nearly $2 billion in October. The currency's movements will directly affect two other economic problem areas, inflation and state finances. A big depreciation of the pound would put upward pressure on consumer prices; Egypt is the world's biggest wheat importer so more expensive imports would threaten additional hardship for the estimated one fifth of Egyptians who live in poverty. | ||
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